Boeing cost cutting = Boeing jets crashing ?

Boeing had been exploring 

the construction of an 

all-new airplane earlier 

this decade. 

But after American Airlines 

began discussing orders 

for a new plane from 

Airbus in 2011, Boeing 

abruptly changed course, 

settling on the faster alternative

of modifying its popular 737

 into a new MAX model. 

Ethiopian Airlines 

flight ET302 

crashed.

157 people died.

The 4-month old 737 MAX 8’s 

anti-stall software reengaged 

itself four times in six minutes 

as pilots struggled to straighten 

the plane post-takeoff. 

The anti-stall software won.

The plane crashed March 10, 2019.

And 346 people had died on a 737 MAX 8

in the October 29, 2018 Lion Air crash. 

With over 5,000 orders 

for the plane, 

which costs $121 million, 

there’s big money involved !

Boeing’s assertion that a software fix 

is the answer ... may not be true !

A lot of lawsuits are expected !

The Seattle Times 

had an article 

on March 26, 2019.

They claim 

there are serious 

hardware problems

with the planes:

"Lack Of Redundancies 

On Boeing 737 MAX 

System Baffles Some 

Involved in Developing The Jet"

"Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers from a range of potential disruptions, from electrical faults to lightning strikes. 

The company typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for crucial tasks to reduce the possibility of a disastrous failure. 

Its most advanced planes, for instance, have three flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different processors manufactured by different companies. 

So even some of the people who have worked on Boeing’s new 737 MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed an automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component redundancy, ultimately entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor 

— a type of sensor that was known to fail."

Boeing’s rival, Airbus, has typically depended on three such sensors. 

“A single point of failure is an absolute no-no,” said one former Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX, who requested anonymity to speak frankly about the program in an interview with The Seattle Times. 

“That is just a huge system engineering oversight. 

To just have missed it, I can’t imagine how.” 

Boeing’s design made the flight crew the fail-safe backup to the safety system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. 

The Times has interviewed eight people in recent days who were involved in developing the MAX, which remains grounded around the globe in the wake of two crashes that killed a total of 346 people.

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was already a late addition that Boeing had not planned for initially. 

They wanted a plane that was so like older ones that no training would be needed, but did put a much heavier engine in it, which was why MCAS was needed. 

As I wrote earlier today, they cut corners until there was no corner left. 

On hardware, on software, on pilot training (simulator), everything was done to be cheaper than Airbus.

A faulty reading from an angle-of-attack sensor (AOA) — used to assess whether the plane is angled up so much that it is at risk of stalling — is now suspected in the October crash of a 737 MAX in Indonesia, with data suggesting that MCAS pushed the aircraft’s nose toward Earth to avoid a stall that wasn’t happening. 

Investigators have said another crash in Ethiopia this month has parallels to the first.

Boeing has been working to rejigger its MAX software in recent months, and that includes a plan to have MCAS consider input from both of the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors, according to officials familiar with the new design. 

“Our proposed software update incorporates additional limits and safeguards to the system and reduces crew workload,” Boeing said in a statement. 

But one problem with two-point redundancies is that if one sensor goes haywire, the plane may not be able to automatically determine which of the two readings is correct, so Boeing has indicated that the MCAS safety system will not function when the sensors record substantial disagreement.

The underlying idea is so basic and simple it hurts: safety come in groups of three: three flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different processors manufactured by different companies, and three sensors. 

The logic behind this is so overwhelming it’s hard to see how anyone but a sociopathic accountant can even ponder ditching it.

Some observers, including the former Boeing engineer, think the safest option would be for Boeing to have a third sensor to help ferret out an erroneous reading, much like the three-sensor systems on the airplanes at rival Airbus. 

Adding that option, however, could require a physical retrofit of the MAX."